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Dot arrays are often used to study basic numerical skills across cultures, species and
development. Researchers investigate the ability of subjects to discriminate between dot
arrays, as a function of the ratio or distance between their numerosities. Such studies
have contributed significantly to the number sense theory (i.e., that humans are born with
the ability to process numerosities, and share this ability with various species)—possibly
the most influential theory in numerical cognition literature today. However, a dot array
contains, in addition to numerosity, continuous properties such as the total surface area
of the dots, their density, etc. These properties are highly correlated with numerosity
and therefore might influence participants’ performance. Different ways in which different
studies choose to deal with this confound sometimes lead to contradicting results, and
in our opinion, do not completely eliminate the confound. In this work, we review these
studies and suggest several possible reasons for the contradictions in the literature. We
also suggest that studying continuous properties, instead of just trying to control them,
may contribute to unraveling the building blocks of numerical abilities.
Keywords: numerical cognition, ANS, number sense, non-symbolic stimuli, visual properties, discrete, continuous,
magnitude processing
INTRODUCTION
Humans and animals share the ability to estimate and discrim-
inate magnitudes. In animals, these abilities are crucial for sur-
vival. For example, swimming with the larger shoal increases the
probability of fish to survive (Agrillo et al., 2008), and estimat-
ing the number of lions in the opponent group affects the group’s
decision to “fight or flight” (McComb et al., 1994). Humans are
able to estimate and compare magnitudes from a very early age
(Piazza, 2010) and use these abilities every day. It is suggested
that our mathematical abilities are built upon these basic skills
(Dehaene, 1997; Cantlon et al., 2009; Piazza, 2010).
To study such basic and universal abilities, many researchers
use dot arrays to investigate non-symbolic representation of
quantities. Discriminating between such arrays is not culture-
related and does not require language or formal education, mak-
ing this type of stimuli ideal for developmental, cross-cultural
and animal studies. In these studies, researchers manipulate the
numerosity of the dots in the arrays and then ask subjects to com-
pare the numerosities, indicate if two arrays have the same or
different numerosity, or indicate which array contains more dots.
It is important to remember that dot arrays contain, in addition
to numerosity, other visual properties, such as the total surface of
the dots, their density, the total space they occupy, etc. We will
refer to these properties as continuous properties. Unlike discrete
properties (i.e., the number of dots), one can only estimate con-
tinuous properties, even without time limitation. For example,
no matter how much time you have, you cannot tell the exact
cumulative area of the dots in an array. You can only estimate it.
This review will deal mainly with visually presented non-symbolic
quantities.
Studies involving dot arrays contributed significantly to highly
influential theories such as the number sense (Dehaene, 1997)
and the approximate number system (ANS) (Cantlon et al.,
2009). Dehaene’s number sense theory (1997) suggests that both
humans and animals are born with a sense for numbers. A
“number processor” component allows both humans and ani-
mals to “represent quantities and transform them according to
the rules of arithmetic” (p. 18). The ANS theory (Cantlon et al.,
2009) suggests that numerical symbols “build on the approx-
imate number system (ANS) which represents the number of
discrete objects or events as a continuous mental magnitude”
(p. 83). Note that the majority of studies involving dot arrays
focus on numerosities; the numerosity is systematically manipu-
lated and the participants’ attention is directed to this dimension.
Furthermore, as mentioned in a review by Mix et al. (2002),
some researchers even suggested that “once numerical compe-
tence has been shown, all subsequent development must be
guided by discrete number bias” (p. 278). In the current work,
we raise two issues—theoretical and methodological—suggesting
that numerosity might not be the only visual property that is
extracted from a set and is the basis for numerical abilities.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
There are two ecological factors that must be considered when
discussing the influence of discrete and continuous properties on
numerical cognition. First, the only non-symbolic way to visu-
ally convey numerosities is through arrays of items. These arrays
always carry continuous properties that highly correlate with
numerosities. To study numerosity in isolation, one must neu-
tralize the effect of all continuous properties at once; namely, the
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only difference between two arrays (e.g., an array containing four
dots and an array containing 10 dots) should be the numerosity,
and continuous properties (e.g., the total surface area of the dots,
their density, average size, etc.) should be identical. This is phys-
ically impossible. For example, if there are four squares in one
array and 2 in another array and all the squares are of the same
size, the four squares have greater total surface area than the two
squares. To control for area, one can equalize the total surface of
the two arrays. However, this means that the density and average
size will have changed (see Figure 1). Given these high correla-
tions, it seems more plausible to postulate a system that takes into
consideration both discrete and continuous properties.
Second, from an evolutionary perspective, in most cases dis-
crimination between magnitudes (as opposed to enumeration) is
enough to make a decision. For example, fish select a shoal by
comparing the sizes of two shoals. It is impossible to determine
that their choice was based on the absolute number of fish in a
shoal. In contrast, using numerosities might help when one needs
to produce an exact value. For animals, this is rarely the case. If
animals need to enumerate, it is usually in the subitizing range
(i.e., 1–4 items) (Gross et al., 2009). Hence, it is hard to imag-
ine a system that was designed to ignore most visual cues (i.e.,
continuous properties) and attend only to a discrete one (see also
Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012a,b). For humans, the need for enu-
meration is cultural, not innate. Premack and Premack (2005)
argued that cultural changes (the adaptation to new technolo-
gies) required the development of exact representation. Studies
on hunter-gatherer groups (Gordon, 2004; Pica et al., 2004) are
examples of cultures that do not require exact representation
of magnitudes. Even the few number words in their lexicon are
not comparable to Western number words because they repre-
sent approximate numbers. Importantly, in the study of Dehaene
et al. (2008), 22% of the uneducated Amazonian adults failed to
map numbers 1–3 in the right order and 37% of the participants
exhibited bimodal mapping, using only the end points of the line
(Núñez, 2011).
To summarize, it looks as though the ability to enumer-
ate is cultural and not evolutionary. To survive, estimation and
discrimination are enough. The question is what properties do
we use to make that estimation? We argue here that since it
is physically impossible to study discrete magnitudes in isola-
tion, it is difficult to accept theories such as the ANS and the
number senses, which suggest numerosity is the most salient
cue. It is more likely that we integrate multiple visual cues to
make size estimations (Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012a,b). Another
theory that might lead to a similar conclusion (i.e., using all
available cues) is the theory of magnitudes—ATOM (Walsh,
2003). The ATOM suggests that all magnitudes, in all modali-
ties, are being represented in the same region in the brain—the
parietal lobe—since they are all needed to allow us to physi-
cally interact with the environment. In other words, the pur-
pose of all magnitude processing is to guide motor actions.
Following this logic, it is more instrumental to use all available
cues in the environment—not only discrete ones—to make size
estimations.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Since neutralizing changes in continuous properties is impossible,
different studies chose different ways to control those properties:
manipulating only one continuous property at a time (Mussolin
and Mejias, 2010—developmental study); assigning a random
dot size to each array (Piazza, 2010); using a single array con-
taining two different colors of dots where participants (children
and adults) must indicate the color of the more numerous dots
(Halberda et al., 2008); etc. Studies using such methods to con-
trol for continuous properties share a hidden assumption that
participants rely only on one visual cue throughout the entire
experiment. Thus, by making this cue an unreliable predic-
tor of numerosity, participants have no choice but to rely on
numerosities. It is important to note that different methodolo-
gies (imaging, behavioral, computer modeling) used the same
logic and similar stimuli. We chose to focus mainly on behavioral
FIGURE 1 | Illustration—Controlling continuous magnitudes. Controlling for one continuous magnitude always changes other continuous magnitudes.
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studies, although these methodological issues apply to other
methodologies as well.
Different means of controlling continuous properties led to
contradicting results in the literature. Stoianov and Zorzi (2012)
demonstrated the existence of “numerosity detectors” in a com-
puter modeling methodology. However, these detectors received
input from a layer that encoded cumulative area. Hurewitz
et al. (2006) had adults compare two dot arrays that differed
in their numerosity and continuous properties. The numeros-
ity was either congruent or incongruent with surface area. The
authors reported that adults automatically processed the continu-
ous properties of the arrays when asked to compare numerosities.
They also found the reverse influence (i.e., that numerosity was
processed automatically when comparing areas) but to a lesser
extent. In response to those results, Barth (2008) suggested that
the ratio between the surface areas of the arrays was always greater
for incongruent trials, and that the difference between incongru-
ent and congruent trials is actually a ratio effect (i.e., the surface
areas of the two arrays were more similar in incongruent than
in the congruent condition, resulting in longer reaction times
for incongruent trials), and not an interference effect. Nys and
Content (2012) employed a design similar to that of Hurewitz
et al. (2006) and suggested that only discrete properties are pro-
cessed automatically. In these studies, as in others in the field,
there was an effort to assure that continuous properties would
not interfere. However, there are almost no reports on efforts to
check that continuous properties indeed did not interfere. For
example, Odic et al. (2013) presented participants (children and
adults) two arrays of dots and asked which array contained more
dots. In 50% of the trials, the array with more dots had larger
cumulative area (congruent trials), while the rest of the trials were
incongruent. The authors found no congruity effect of cumulative
area and concluded that participants did not rely on continuous
properties to make their decisions. This holds true for cumu-
lative area but not necessarily for other continuous properties
that were not investigated. In contrast to those results, Gebuis
and Reynvoet (2012b) compared brain activity while partici-
pants passively viewed dot arrays or had to actively compare their
numerosities. The authors found that numerosity was extracted
only when it was relevant to the task, while continuous proper-
ties were always extracted. In a psychophysical study, Burr and
Ross (2008) suggested that number, similarly to other basic visual
properties such as color, contrast, and size, is an adaptable visual
property. Hence, numerosity is a basic visual property. However,
based on that work, Durgin (2008) suggested that Burr and Ross
(2008) actually adapted participants to density.
As demonstrated by the studies mentioned above, findings
regarding the role of discrete and continuous properties in esti-
mation and discrimination of magnitudes are inconsistent and
often contradicting. Some studies suggest that discrete proper-
ties are processed automatically (i.e., Piazza et al., 2004, 2007;
Barth, 2008; Burr and Ross, 2008; Cantlon et al., 2009; Piazza,
2010; Soltész et al., 2010), or that only discrete properties are
being processed automatically (e.g., Nys and Content, 2012).
Other studies suggest the opposite; namely, that continuous
magnitudes are processed automatically (Clearfield and Mix,
1999, developmental study); (Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012a,b),
and that numerosities affect performance only if relevant to
the task (Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012b). There are also findings
proposing that both dimensions are processed automatically, but
with different levels of automaticity (i.e., Hurewitz et al., 2006).
Consequently, some studies tried to directly investigate the source
of the inconsistencies in the literature. Gebuis and Reynvoet
(2012a) controlled continuous properties differently in four com-
parative judgment tasks and reported different result patterns for
each task. Specifically, the influence of the continuous properties
increased with the number of continuous cues available for the
participants. Thus, variability in the degree of available continu-
ous properties might be one of the sources for the contradicting
reports in the literature. Tokita and Ishiguchi (2010) found that
in estimation tasks, the total area of the dots in an array affected
numerical estimation but only for arrays containing more than
five dots. When the same experiment was preceded by practice
sessions with feedback, the effect of the continuous properties
vanished. Hence, both practice and the numerosity range inter-
acted with the influence of continuous properties. Other works
(e.g., Nieder et al., 2006; Tokita and Ishiguchi, 2010) presented
successive visual stimuli (e.g., dots) to avoid confounds of contin-
uous properties. This type of presentation confounds numerosity
with duration and rhythm; it takes longer to present more stim-
uli. Equating the time means different rates of presentation, etc.
In addition, similar to the way we accumulate numerosity, we
can also accumulate surface area. Moreover, when dots are pre-
sented in the same location [like in the works of Nieder et al.
(2006), and Tokita and Ishiguchi (2010), there is a possibility of
a confound from visual aftereffects. Nieder et al. recorded neural
activity from the intra parietal sulcus (IPS) of monkeys perform-
ing a comparison task, and reported that duration and rhythm
affected the activity of 8 out of 58 neurons. They concluded that
time and rhythm did not affect performance. However, other
brain regions besides the IPS were never tested. It is possible
that other parts of the brain are involved in processing of such
properties. It is also important to note that Nieder et al.’s work
dealt only with quantities of 1–4 (the subitizing range) and that
most of the presentation forms were canonical. Hence, it is not
clear if the results can be generalized to other quantities. There
is also no mention of an attempt to check for the influence of
continuous properties in consecutive presentation format. Tokita
and Ishiguchi (2012) did not report any attempt to investigate
possible contributions of their results to temporal or continuous
properties.
Some authors attempted to use other dimensions (e.g., audi-
tion) to evade the above mentioned problems. However, it seems
that other dimensions are susceptible to similar difficulties. For
example, Beran (2012) had monkeys choose between sets of food
items, only by hearing the items fall into a container. However,
the duration of dropping four items and two items is differ-
ent, and equalizing the duration means increasing the rhythm.
Thus, even in the auditory modality, one encounters the same
issues as with visually presented quantities. For a more extensive
review of auditory stimuli in developmental studies see Mix et al.
(2002).
To summarize, continuous and discrete properties are highly
correlated. Consequently, it is hard to exclude the influence
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of continuous properties and study the influence of a discrete
property—numerosity—in isolation. Studies used various meth-
ods to control the effects of continuous properties. Those studies
worked under the assumption that the experimental design pre-
vented participants from using continuous properties. However,
in most of those studies, this assumption was not verified. There
was either no attempt to test for possible influence of continuous
magnitudes, or, like inOdic et al.’s (2013) study, only the influence
of the manipulated continuous property was investigated. Thus,
in all the studies mentioned above, it is impossible to be sure that
the participants’ response was based only on numerosity.
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION
Relying on continuous magnitudes enables “quick and dirty” esti-
mations; for example, where there are more predators, where
there is more food, etc. From the ATOM point of view, the faster
we make magnitude estimations, the faster we will be able to plan
and execute actions. From an evolutionary perspective, it is suffi-
cient in most cases to make “quick and dirty” estimations. Hence,
it makes sense to theorize that if we are born with the ability to
discriminate magnitudes, it is due to discriminating continuous
and not discrete properties.
Von Aster and Shalev (2007) suggested a four-step develop-
mental model of numerical cognition. The first step in this model
occurs in infancy. This step postulated an inherited “core sys-
tem representation of cardinal magnitude and accompanying
functions, such as subitizing, approximation and comparison”
(p. 870). The authors’ suggestion was based on studies discussed
above (Section Methodological issues). In light of the criticism of
these studies, and new findings from the last few years (Gebuis
and Gevers, 2011; Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012a,b; Henik et al.,
2012), we suggest that earlier abilities have to develop before
the first step in the model of Von Aster and Shalev (2007) can
occur. Specifically, we consider the ability to estimate continuous
properties as the first step in a process that will allow us, later
in development, to understand and represent numerosities and
symbolic numbers.
Our suggested model is illustrated in Figure 2. This model
presents the ways in which magnitudes are represented and dis-
criminated at different developmental stages. In line with other
theories, we postulate an innate ability to discriminate magni-
tudes. However, we suggest that the initial ability is restricted
to continuous magnitudes (stage 1 in our model). Two reasons
lead to this suggestion. First, it has been suggested that when
FIGURE 2 | Suggested developmental model. The figure illustrates how
the two dot arrays at the top of the image are represented at different
developmental stages. The model postulates that we are born with the ability
to discriminate between continuous properties. During development we
learn the correlation between discrete and continuous properties. This allows
us to use both discrete and continuous properties to estimate magnitudes.
Later, with formal education we are able to represent the exact difference
between different magnitudes.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 375 | 4
Leibovich and Henik Non-symbolic stimuli
appropriate control is exerted, continuous rather than discrete
properties seem to dominate infant performance (Clearfield and
Mix, 1999; Gebuis and Gevers, 2011; Gebuis and Reynvoet,
2012a,b). Second, most of the magnitude discrimination stud-
ies in newborns and infants were investigated using the visual
domain, and as such, may be limited by visual acuity of the
newborn, which is about 12–25 times worse than that of an
adult (Dobson and Teller, 1978; Banks and Shannon, 2013). With
age, discrimination between magnitudes improves (Brannon
et al., 2006). During development, we are constantly exposed to
the environmental correlation between discrete and continuous
properties. Thus, in stage 2 we begin to notice this correlation:
larger area and density usually mean more numerous. Piaget’s
(1952) report that children judged five widely spaced coins to
be more numerous than five densely spaced coins is an example
of overgeneralization of that correlation. In stage 3, children are
able to use both discrete and continuous properties to discrimi-
nate magnitudes. With formal education, enumeration skills are
developed and a child might know not only that array “a” is more
numerous than array “b,” but also by howmuch (stage 4). Further
developmental studies are needed to empirically test the suggested
model and to specify the age ranges in which the different stages
take place.
CONCLUSION
We reviewed studies investigating comparative judgment of dot
arrays and showed the contradicting results they have found. We
suggest that these conflicting results are due to the fact that it is
physically impossible to completely neutralize the effect of con-
tinuous properties, not only in the visual domain. The different
ways that different studies chose to deal with this confound has
led to variability in the results and the conclusions. Thus, in our
opinion, theories such as the number sense and the ANS, which
consider numerosity to be the most salient cue and the basis for
our numerical abilities, should be revised to include continuous
properties. We further suggest that directly studying the contri-
bution of continuous properties to the ability to discriminate
magnitudes, throughout normal and impaired development, in
adults as well as in children, might shed light on the basis of
numerical cognition.
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